On 27 October 2026 one transaction took 1.14m $XRD out of the ASTRL/XRD Flex Pool on Ociswap, a decentralized exchange on Radix, by way of the poolās own flash-loan method. ASTRL is the token of Astrolescent, a Radix exchange aggregator. A flash loan lends tokens that must be repaid before the transaction that borrowed them finalizes, or the whole transaction fails. The attacker borrowed, swapped and repaid inside a single manifest, and 90 minutes later sent the proceeds to Ethereum over Hyperlane.
What the ledger shows
The transaction, txid_rdx1l9nasā¦q4h93, committed at 06:32 UTC. Its manifest makes these calls in order:
It borrows 1,200 $XRD by flash loan from Ociswapās fUSD/XRD Pool V2 and swaps them for ASTRL in a second Ociswap pool.
It borrows 160,984 ASTRL by flash loan from the ASTRL/XRD Flex Pool itself.
With that loan still open, it swaps 7 ASTRL into the same Flex Pool, which pays out 1,140,952 $XRD.
It repays the ASTRL loan with 161,128 ASTRL, 145 more than it borrowed.
It swaps the ASTRL left over back to $XRD in the second pool and repays the first loan with 1,201.08 $XRD.
The difference stays in the attackerās account, account_rdx1286xā¦gvnu30. Read from the Radix Gateway at 08:10 UTC, the Flex Pool held 7,680 $XRD and 1,163 ASTRL. The accountās only earlier transaction was a deposit of 10.1 $XRD on 26 October.
The manifest records the order of the calls and the amounts. It does not show why the pool priced a 7 ASTRL swap at 1.14m $XRD while its own ASTRL was on loan; the poolās pricing explains it, under What happens next.
Where the $XRD went
At 08:02 UTC the account withdrew 1,139,495 $XRD in txid_rdx1jmqpkā¦qaqd5 and called transfer_remote on Hyperlaneās XRD warp route, with destination domain 1, which is Ethereum, and a twenty-byte EVM recipient ending a8d1. It paid 380.04 $XRD in interchain gas. The same bridge carried the proceeds of the August 2026 asset drain out of Radix.
What happens next
At 06:54 UTC a member of Ociswapās Telegram group posted the transaction, warned that every Flex Pool was exposed and told liquidity providers to withdraw. Florian Pieper of Ociswap replied at 08:04 UTC that he was looking into it.
At 09:55 UTC he wrote that the exploit affects only the first, rarely used version of the Flex Pool, package_rdx1pkzxmā¦qcglwe, and asked liquidity providers in pools built from it to withdraw. The ASTRL/XRD pool is one of them: the Radix Gateway reports its blueprint as FlexPool 1.0.0 from that package. He listed three pool types as unaffected: the current Flex Pool, package_rdx1phyk2ā¦dqksqq; the Precision Pool, which has no external dependency a flash loan could put out of step; and the Basic Pool, which has no flash loan. Ociswap showed holders how to check which package a pool uses, by opening its component on the Radix Dashboard. By 16:07 UTC the ASTRL/XRD pool held 32 $XRD and 147 ASTRL, read from the Gateway.
The Radix Gateway shows that the first Flex Pool keeps its liquidity in a native TwoResourcePool, the two-token pool component built into Radix. On 27 October an Ociswap user, Mike Nguyen, repeated the attackerās method: the current Flex Pool panics as soon as a swap and a flash loan hit it in the same transaction, and the Precision Pool priced the swap correctly. On 28 October Pieper replied with the reason the Precision Pool is immune: it does not take its price from the ratio of the two tokens in a native TwoResourcePool, but keeps an internal price that tracks its concentrated liquidity, and uses its vaults only to store tokens, so a flash loan that empties a vault moves neither its price nor its liquidity. Read against the manifest, that is the opening the attacker used: with 160,984 ASTRL out on loan, the first Flex Poolās vault held almost no ASTRL, and a price taken from the ratio of its two vaults valued the 7 ASTRL swapped in at nearly all of its $XRD.
Ociswap has not said whether liquidity providers will be compensated; this page will carry it when it does.
