---
title: "NetOps WG · Decide the validator subsidy future & pseudo-jailing"
url: "https://radix.wiki/ideas/dao-validator-subsidy-future"
version: "1.1.0"
updated: 2026-08-16
license: CC-BY-4.0
license_url: "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"
---

# NetOps WG · Decide the validator subsidy future & pseudo-jailing

| Status | 🟠 Proposed |
| --- | --- |
| Working Group | Network Operations WG |
| Category | ⚙️ Protocol |
| Governance Phase | Phase 1 – active at launch |
| Champion | Faraz |
| Origin | [RFC – Validator Subsidy & Pseudo-Jailing](https://radixtalk.com/t/rfc-the-future-of-the-validator-subsidy-pseudo-jailing/2167) |

The validator subsidy underwrites network liveness and is one of the DAO's most consequential early decisions. The RFC weighs ending it immediately, a phased reduction, or continuing it, alongside an optional pseudo-jailing mechanism to enforce uptime.

## Where it stands (August 2026)

Re-measured on 16 August 2026 at epoch 335598, the concentration figure in the RFC has moved, and against the target. The RFC weighs the decision on a top-50 share of roughly 85% and asks for a median around 1%. A whole read of the validator list returns 4,773,496,229 XRD staked, of which the top 50 validators hold **90.66%**; the top 10 alone hold 39.94%, and the median of the 100-slot active set – the 50th validator, on 20,791,259 XRD – is **0.436%** of stake, under half the target.

The survey question the RFC poses therefore lands on a narrower base than it assumes. Only 89 validators hold a million XRD or more, and the bottom of the active set runs to tens of thousands: rank 100 holds 45,500 XRD. Those are the operators for whom ending the subsidy is a decision about whether to keep a node running at all, and they are the same operators [the recruitment card](/ideas/dao-grow-validator-set) is trying to add to.

## Deliverables

- Vote the subsidy timeline (immediate / phased to ~2-month transition / continue).
- Decide whether to implement pseudo-jailing (committee votes, stake-weight thresholds, 70%+ opt-in).
- Address validator-set concentration (top-50 hold ~85% of stake; target ~1% median).
- Survey validators on how many would exit if the subsidy ends.

## Dependencies & cross-references

- Governed by [Daffy's Radix DAO framework](https://github.com/Shadaffy/radix-dao) (repo `Shadaffy/radix-dao`); see the [Governance Framework Reference Repo](https://radixtalk.com/t/rfc-dao-governance-framework-reference-repo/2268) and [Charter (Round 1)](https://radixtalk.com/t/rfc-dao-documents-round1-the-charter/2269).
- Funded from [operating budgets](/ideas/dao-operating-budgets).
- Administered by [a subsidy-administration entity](/ideas/dao-subsidy-admin-entity).

## Sources

- [RFC: The Future of the Validator Subsidy & Pseudo Jailing](https://radixtalk.com/t/rfc-the-future-of-the-validator-subsidy-pseudo-jailing/2167)